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66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-2666
Attorneys for Defendant
Home Savings & Loan Assoc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

MOTION OF HOME SAVINGS AND
LOAN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VINCENT ROTTA, JR.,
Plaintiff,

Civil No.
Civil No.
Civil No.
Civil No.

vs.
HAL HAWK, et al.,

C84-6174
C85-5268
C85-5384
C86-1310

Defendants.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Home Savings and Loan Association moves this Court pursuant to Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, for judgment determining that its Trust Deedfs on the five
parcels which are the subject of these consolidated actions are superior to each and all of
the mechanics liens which have been filed against the subject properties. This Motion is
not directed to the claims, if any, of Vincent Rotta, Jr., in the subject parcels.
This motion is based upon the all the pleadings on file herein, the Affidavits filed
herewith, and the Memorandum of Law filed in support of the Motion, all of which
demonstrate that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that Home
Savings and Loan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this ?

day of

/WvL£

, 1986.

^U'VWil
Keith W. Meade
Attorney for Defendant
Home Savings & Loan Assoc.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Notice of Hearing was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the ^y

day of MynJ]

?

1986, to the following:
James E. Morton
HATCH, ELDREDGE & MORTON
Attorney for Vincent Rotta, Jr.
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Noall T. Wootton
8 Center Street
P.O.Box 310
American Fork, Utah 84003

Grant G. Orton
ORTON & PETTY
Attorney for Pihl and Clark
Enterprise's, Inc., IPC Ltd.,
a Utah Limited Partnership,
Equity Reliance Corporation
2060 East 3300 South, Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Scott E. Miller
Chief Title Officer
Universal Title Insurance
5776 Lincoln Drive
Edina, Minnesota 55436
A. H. Boyce
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

David Stazinsky
Security Title
330 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

C. Reed Brown
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorney for Kirby Building
Systems, Inc.
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Parley R. Baldwin
BROWNING, BLACKBURN & BALDWIN
Attorney for Johnson Electric Motors.
Bank of Utah, Suite 320
2605 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

Randall L. Skeen
Attorney for Defendant
Geneva Rock Products
4069 South 4000 West
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Walter F. Bugden
BUGDEN, COLLINS <5c KELLER
8 East Broadway, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Steven H. Gunn
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Lynn J. Clark
Attorney for RCI, Inc., a Utah corporation
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108
Midvale, Utah 84047

Kent Collins
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(HomeSav-7)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIg l A L DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VINCENT ROTTA, JR.,
Plaintiff,

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
C-84-6174
C-85-5268
C-85-5384
C-86-1310

Civil Nos,

vs.
HAL HAWK, et al.,
Defendants.

Before the Court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment
on the question of priority of liens between Home Savings as
mortgagee and Western General as general contractor.

All parties

agree that there are no material questions of fact, and that
the issue of priorities should and can be decided as a matter
of law.

Also before the Court is Western General's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment against Pihl and Clark.
appeared and argued their respective positions.

All counsel

The Court took

the matter under advisement to further consider the issues raised
by the parties, consider further the Memoranda and legal argument,
together with supplemental authorities submitted by the parties.
The Court has now reviewed those matters so submitted, including
the Memoranda and Affidavits on file, and being otherwise fully
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.
Based upon the facts and circumstances before the Court
as undisputed facts regarding the question of "commencement

ROTTA V. HAWK
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

to do work" as that term is used in Section 38-1-5 of the Utah
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, it does not appear to the Court,
under the appropriate case law that governs the issue, that
there has been a "commencement to do work" so as to place the
lien claimants ahead of the mortgagee.

Therefore, the Motion

for Summary Judgment of Home Savings is granted, and the Motion
for Summary Judgment of Western General is denied.
As to Western General's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
as to Pihl and Clark, the record reflects that there are material
questions of fact existing which would prohibit Summary Judgment
on the issues presented in that Motion, and therefore the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.
Counsel for Home Savings and Pihl and Clark are to prepare
appropriate Orders in conformance with this Memorandum Decision,
and submit the same to the Court for review and signature in
accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this

/ -~~* day of June, 198 6.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Home Savings and Loan
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
* *
s'

*

*

*

*

*

VINCENT ROTTA, JR.,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. C84-6174
Civil No. C85-5268
Civil No. C85-5384
Civil No. C86-1310

vs.
HAL HAWK, et al.,
Defendants.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

This consolidated action came on for hearing at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, May 5, 1986
before the Honorable Timothy Hansen on various motions for summary judgment,
including the motion of Home Savings and Loan for summary judgment against all parties
except Vincent Rotta.

The Court, having considered the argument of counsel, the

memoranda filed regarding the motion, the pleadings on file, and the Stipulation of the
parties made in open court that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding
the issue of priority, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1.

There was no "commencement to do work or furnish materials" as that term

is used in U.C.A. §38-1-5 prior to the recording of the interest of Home Savings and Loan
on the property described in Exhibit "A",
2.

The interest of Home Savings and Loan in the property described in Exhibit

"ATf is prior to and superior to the interest of the lien claimants 1 and against said lien
claimants, the title of Home Savings and Loan is quieted to the property described in
Exhibit "A".

ROTTA V. HAWK
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of June, 1986:

Richard A. Rappaport
Keith W. Meade
^Attorney for Def. Home Savings
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
^ J a m e s E. Morton
Attorney for Vincent Rotta, Jr.
3450 Highland Dr., #304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Offcoall T. Wootton
Attorney for Western Gen.
P. 0. Box 310
American Fork, Utah 84003
Grant G. Orton
^Attorney for Pihl & Clark
2060 East 3300 South #102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Scott E. Miller
^/ Chief Title Officer
Universal Title Ins.
5776 Lincoln Drive
Edina, Minnesota 55436
David Stazinsky
Security Title
330 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

A. H. Boyce
68 S. Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Kent Collins
50 S. Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

u

Randall W. Richards
//"Attorney for Pioneer Door
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Parley R. Baldwin
^/'Attorney for Johnson Elect.
Bank of Utah, Suite 320
Ogden, Utah 84401
ts Steven H. Gunn
400 Deseret Bldg.
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
C. Reed Brown
^3450 Highland Drive, #301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
u/

Walter F. Bugden
#8 E. Broadway, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Lynn J. Clark
^/Attorney for RCI, Inc.
935 East 7220 South, #D-108
Midvale, Utah 84047
Randall L. Skeen, Esq.
^4069 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
^

This judgment has no affect upon the interest, if any/of

Vincent Rotta in the

subject property. . i:,
.,' ; \ DATED this" ' j ffday of Q f r i t ^

j 1986.
BYI^HECOUfeT

a ^ *

>

*
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and^6
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the

/

day ofv^

!t copy of the ioRegwffig^Was
, 1986, to the following:

Noall T. Wootton
8 Center Street
P.O. Box 310
American Fork, Utah 84003

James E. Morton
HATCH, EL DREDGE & MORTON
Attorney fo Vincent Rotta, Jr.
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Scott E. Miller
R. Dale Potter UL>U\JO uiowAd-ie DV. suite ti Chief Title Officer
Universal Title Insurance
-&£84-Seu*ft-33Q-West, IC-2745-776 Lincoln Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah-84W-7-su„ b Edina/JMinnesota 55436 '
Grant G. Orton
ORTON & PETTY
A. H. Boyce
800 Mclntyre Building
Attorney fpr Pihl and Clark
68 South Main Street
Enterprises, Inc., IPC Ltd.,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
a Utah Limited Partnership,
Equity Keliance Corporation
Randall W. Richards
2060 East 3300 South, Suite 102
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales
2568 Washington Blvd.
David Stanzinsky
Ogden, Utah 84401
Security Title
330 East 400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parley R. Baldwin
BROWNING, BLACKBURN tc BALDWIN
Attorney for Johnson Electric
Motors
Bank of Utah, Suite 320
2605 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
-2-

C. Reed Brown
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorney for Kirby Building
Systems, Inc.
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake city, Utah 84106

Randall L. Skeen
Attorney for Defendant
Geneva Rock Products
W-es^aHey-Otty, Utah 84m—s*-*Steven H. Gunn
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Kent Collins
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

(Home-1)

ur

™}0h

Walter F. Bugden
BUGDEN, COLLINS & KELLER
8 East Broadway, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lynn J. Clark
Attorney for RCI, Inc. a Utah
corporation
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108
Midvale, Utah 84047

•J y o s l l V :,..:• ,;or
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j| Ccr 3 t r u c t i o : i Co .
| | F . O . Box 310
American F o i k , Utah ,84003

General

IN. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

«*

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
X

S-H;,;NT

ROTTA, JR. ,
I/I.ai nf.if f , .

RULE 54b ORDER
Civil Nos. C8*-6174, No.
C85-5268. No. C85-5384
and C86-1310

et.al..
y

STATE OF UTAH

Defendants.
J u r ^ e T i m o t h y Hanson

Pursuant to notice, the >iu- r.. OL t\e plaintiff Western
"'^'-7^1:; Sc^tructiori nomp^v, for a 'ecermination by the Court
I8,IS0-6, W J S a f.ir\,

order under the provisions

: r-u')> 54iv"of t^e viTt&b Rules of Givi'

rocedure, came on regularl

fder of jvXy

k

.r r,^-^"1

tirfoie -*c Honorable Txm Hanson, Judge of the above
'.o^a^ber #: . 1.r<?>6 ,

>. "t.
'?'""'

J

:,.}.L'.'

i\erde
:

> .•'-.,:?•.,•

L;ket ;i

• ••,.:••:
i,

r •'•:»;•

its attorney.

:.ir5;- fct tellef ar
r7 o-

e hour of 4:00 p.m.

i,

Products appeared throt

„.-..er n o w having been submit

:

•••%?£' no'j finC that there are multiple

..ciple parties to this action. T h e judgmei

he be?•.•••'•• a of rV,e Ord. :
;J. << b /

T h e defendan

-. ,\ Presented by its counsel

T h e d. fer*dan: venev-j K\cck

• ti./ Co».:. •', chi

1

•

.ant ;ig the M o t i o n for Summary

.*•'••.. savings and Lo n Association would b e a n

-

1
2

2 -

appealable judgment and Order but for the fact that other parties
remain

in the action.

3
This Court determines in its sound discretion that there is

4
5
6

no just reason for delay of the appeal of Western General Construe
Company, if they choose to do so.
Dated this

7

day" of

November,1986.

8
BY THE COURT:
9
10
JUDGE TIMOTHY HANSON

11
12

Approved as to form:

13
14

Attorney for Home Savings
and Loan Association

15
16
17

Attorney for Geneva Rock
Products

18
19
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

20
21

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

22

foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following,

23

this

24

Randall L. Skeen
Attorney for Geneva Rock Products
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

25
26
K50TTON, SMITH
* ASSOCIATES
ITOHNEYSATLAW
J NORTH CENTER
ERICAN FORK, UTAH
756-3576

/ Vi

day of November, 1986 :
Richard A. Rappaport
Keith W. Meade
Attorneys for Home Saving;
Loan
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411

- 3 1

James E. Morton
Attorney
for Vincent Rotta, Jr
2
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 304
3 Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

C. Reed Brown
Attorney for Kirby Building
3450 Highland Drive, Suite'301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

4 A.H. Boyce
800 Mclntyre Building
5 68 South Main St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
6
Randall W. Richards
7 Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden,
Utah 84401
8

Walter F. Bugden
Bugden, Collins & Keller
#8 East Broadway, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

9 Parley R. Baldwin

Kent Collins
Holme, Roberts & Owen
50 South Main Street #900
Saltg Lake City, Utah 84144

Attorney for Johnson Electric
[Motors,
Inc.
10
Bank of Utah, Suite 320
11 2605 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
12
Steven H. Gunn
13 400 Deseret Building
79 South Main St.
14 Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Lynn J. Clark
Attorney for RCI, Inc.
935 East 7220 South, #D-108
Midvale, Utah 84047

15 brant G. Orton
Orton & Petty
16 (Attorneys for Pihl & Clark
IPC Ltd., Equity Reliance
17 2060 East 3300 South #102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
18
(Scott E. Miller
19 Chief Title Officer
[Universal Title Insurance
20 5776 Lincoln Drive
Edina, Minnesota 55436
21
JDavid Stazinsky
22 Security Title
330 East 400 South
23 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
24
25
26
H O N , SMITH
ASSOCIATES
RNEYSATLAW
RTH CENTER
AN FORK, UTAH
756-3578

Mu,

.Jys.QifAf c(scZ< s

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated: Those Entitled To
Liens - Who May Be Attached - Lien on Ores and Mines.
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons
performing any services or furnishing any materials
used in the construction, alteration or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work
or furnish materials for the prospective development,
preservation or working of any mining claim, mine,
guarry, oil or gas well or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisians who have furnishe
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys or superintends or who have
rendered other light professional services or bestowed
labor shall have a lien upon the property upon or
concerning which they shall rendered service, performed
labor or furnished materials for the value of the
services rendered, labor performed or materials furnishe
by each respectively, whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as
agent", contractor or otherwise.
38-1-5- Utah Code Annotated:
Other Encumberances.

Priorities Over

The liens herein provided for shall relate back
to and take effect as of the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for
the structure or improvement and shall have priority
over any lien, mortgage, or other encumberance which
may have attached subsequently to the time when the
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work
begun, or first materials furnished on the ground; also,
over any lien mortgage or other encumberance of which
the lien holder has no notice and which was'unrecorded
at the time the building structure or improvement
was commenced, work begun or first material furnished
on the ground.
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Cite as, Utah, 652 PJ2d 922

sufficient to form a binding contract without the required tender of earnest money
Tne judgment of the trial court is affirmed
No costs are awarded
HOWE, J , concurs in the result
HALL, C J , and STEWART and OAKS,
J J , concur

( £ | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

CALDER BROS COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ross L ANDERSON, Signs, I n c , Dunn
Construction Co, Jarvis Electric Co,
Michael Crowley, Michael Crowley dba
Star Palace, Star Palace, Inc., et a l ,
Defendants and Appellants
JARVIS & SONS ELECTRIC CO, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Y

Ross L. ANDERSON and Brent Weeks,
et a l , Defendants
DUNN CONSTRUCTION CO, and Royden, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Ross L. ANDERSON and Allison Anderson, Brent C Weeks and Western
Star Palace, Inc, Defendants.
Nos. 17419, 17458 and 12459.
Supreme Court opMjtaJ/
Aug 24, 1982
A moitgige foreclosure action was consolidated with two other actions brought by
independent contractors to foreclose their
mechanics' liens on the same property The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, George
E Balhf, J , entered judgment in favor of
the mortgagee Appeals were taken The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J , held that (1)

there was ample support for the determination that the hens in favor of the independent contractors did not attach prior to the
mortgage and did not have priority over the
mortgage, (2) the mortgage foreclosure action was not so inextricably intertwined
with an Idaho bankruptcy case as to be
stayed by the bankruptcy case, and (3) the
order appointing a receiver did not go beyond the permissible bounds of the scope of
a receivership
Affirmed

1. Mechanics' Liens <*=>3
Purpose of Mechanics' Lien Act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who
have added directly to value of property of
another by their materials or labor U C A
1953, 38-1-5
2 Mechanics' Liens <^=>168
Phrase "commencement to do work" as
used in mechanics' lien statute is construed
in favor of hen claimants U C A 1953, 38-^
1-5
3 Mechanics' Liens <&=*173
Materialmen's or mechanics' liens resulting from materials furnished or labor
performed relate back to and attach as of
date of commencement of first work on
improvement or structure involved U C A
1953, 38-1-5
4 Mechanics* Liens <s=>173
For one contractor's hen to relate back
to commencement of work or supplying of
materials by another contractor, both contractors' projects must have been performed in connection with what is essentially single project performed under common
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness
and without material abandonment, ordinary maintenance or cleanup work does not
serve as basis for "tacking" so as to fix
earlier hen date for labor and materials
supplied U C A 1953, 38-1-5
5 Mortgages <3=* 151(3)
Liens of contractors could not be
"tacked" onto earlier date so as to have

priority over mortgage which attached in
interim U C A 1953, 38-1-5
6. Bankruptcy <*=»217(4)
Involuntary bankruptcy petition filed
againstindmdual in Idaho did not preclude
mortgage foreclosure action in Utah where
Utah action was not so inextricably interwoven with bankruptcy proceedings in Idaho that proceedings had to be stayed in
toto
Bankr Code, 11 U S C A § 362(a)
7. Judgment <e=>163
Failure to file answer based on mistake
of law raises issue of whether default judgment should be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, not
under catchall exception allowing judgment
to be set aside for any other reason justifying relief from operation oflaw which may
be filed up to three months after judgment,
order or proceeding was entered or taken
Rules Civ Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7)
8. Appeal and Error <*=» 1043(4)
Trial court did not commit reversible
error in appointing receiver to take possession of property and to conduct business
of corporate tenant where corporation was
not stranger to underlying proceeding in
which receiver was appointed Rules Civ
Proc, Rule 66
Robert L Stolebarger, of McDougal, Haley, Dahl & Stolebarger, Salt Lake City, for
Star Palace
John C Backlund, of Young, Backlund,
Harris & Carter, Provo, for Dunn Const
Dallas H Young, Jr , Brent D Young and
Jerry L Reynolds, of Ivie & Young, Provo,
for plaintiff and respondent
STEWART, Justice
In case No 17459 Calder Bros Company
(Calder Bros) brought an action to fore
close a $490,000 purchase money mortgage
against real property sold to Ross Anderson
This action was consolidated in the district
court with two other actions brought by
independent contractors to foreclose their
meehanics' hens against the same property
(Nos 17449 and 17458) The judgment in

favor of Calder Bros in No 17459 is appealed by defendants Star Palace, Inc, Michael
Crowley, and Signs, Inc, on the grounds
that the lower court erred in entering default judgments against them, in denying
Signs' motion to substitute Micro-Investment as the real party in interest, and in
denying Star Palace's motion to vacate an
order appointing a receiver Jarvis & Sons
Electnc Co, Inc (Jarvis), Dunn Construction Co (Dunn), and Royden, Inc (Royden),
appeal the district court's judgments in
Nos 17449 and 17458, establishing Calder
Bros' purchase money mortgage priority
over their mechanics' liens
I The Mortgage and the Mechanics'
Liens (Nos 17449 and 1{458)
On June 14, 1978, Calder Bros conveyed
the reil property commonly known as the
Star Palaee to Ross Anderson by warranty
deed On the same day, Anderson executed
and delivered a purchase money mortgage
to Calder Bros The mortgage was not
recorded until June 27, 1978 Shortly after
the mortgage was recorded, a building permit was obtained from Provo City to make
improvements on the property based on a
submitted set of plans
After the deed and mortgage were executed but before the mortgage was recorded, Anderson hired two young men on an
hourly basis to help cut weeds, cut down
two trees, and grout cracks in the building
They were paid $18 95 for their labor In
addition, a painter was hired to paint the
building with paint supplied by an associate
of Anderson He was paid $850 No mechanics' liens were filed as a result of any
of the above described woik
After Calder Bros ' mortgage was recoided, Anderson hired Jaivis to perform electrical work, Dunn to resurface the parking
area around the building, and Ro>den to
furnish labor and materials On this appeal, they claim that the trial court erred in
holding that their mechanics' liens were
subsequent in priority to the purchase money mortgage and that their puonty should
be established as of the commencement of
the maintenance work which occurred prior
to the recording of the mortgage
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Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 38-1-5 provides plying of materials by another contractor
the guidelines for determining the priority however, both contractors' projects must
of the liens in Ujis case. That section pro- have been performed in connection with
vides:
what is essentially a single project perPriority—Over other encumbrances.— formed under a common plan -prosecuted
The liens herein provided for shall relate with reasonable promptness and without
back to, and take effect as of, the time of material abandonment. See, e.g., Miller
the commencement to do work or furnish Electric Co. of Miami, Inc. v. Sweeny, Fla.
materials on the ground for the structure App., 199 So.2d 734 (19G7); National Lumor improvement, and shall have priority ber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 251 Minn.
over an} lien, mortgage or other encum- 100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957); Fryman v.
brance which may have attached subse- McGhec, 108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E2d 63
quently to the time when the building, (1958}_j Ordinary maintenance or cleanujT"^
improvement or structure was com- work does not serve as a basis for "tacking" /
menced, work begun, or first material so as to fix an earlier lien date under (
furnished on the ground; also over any J § 38-1-5 for labor and materials supplied. \
Q^^l'
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of [ 57C.J.S. MechaqicsJJejjs^jm
which the lien holder had no notice and
[5] The building permit, applied for
which was unrecorded at the time the
June 20, 1978, a date preceding the recordbuilding, structure or improvement was
ing of Caider Bros.' mortgage, was issued
commenced, work begun, or first material
June 28, 1978,, a date subsequent^!*!-thfi
furnished on the ground—
.
recording. prawings made in November,!
[1-3] The purpose of the mechanics
Fl977, and later submitted with the applica-/
^zP^*?
act is remedial in nature and seeks to proJ tion for a building permit, disclosed altera-j i&d*^**
vide protection to laborers and materialmen tions principally related to the interior of]
who have added directly to the value of thel / the building.! "The oiity^exTerior improveproperty of another by their materials or\ ment shown is a drawing of a building with
labor. First of Denver Mortgage Investors \ a peaked roof to replace the existing flat
v. Zundel and Assoc., Utah, 600 P.2d 521 J roof.
(1979); Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50
Nothing in the plans suggested that the
Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917). To accomplish
painting and maintenance work was part of
that purpose, the phrase "commencement to
an improvement project envisioned by the
do work," as used in the mechanics' lien
new owners. The work performed prior to
statute, is construed in favor of lien claimthe recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage
ants. Bankers Trust Co. v. EI Paso Preincluded painting the building exterior, cutst Co., 192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457 (1977). ting down two trees, clearing weeds, and
e also First of Denver Mortgage Inves- placing grout in the building. At no point
tors, supra. Materialmen's and mechanics' up to and including the time Caider Bros.'
liens resulting from materials furnished or mortgage was recorded, was it evident from
labor performed relate back to and attach the inspection of the premises that an imas of the date of the commencement of the provement had been commenced.1 No mafirst work on the improvement or structure terials were delivered to the premises prior
involved. First of Denver Mortgage Inves- to the recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage.
supra.
The trial court found that the cleanup
[4] For one contractor's lien to relate and painting were insubstantial and constiback to the commencement of work or sup- tuted ordinary and necessary maintenance
1. Generally, the presence of building materials
upon the land or other visible evidence of work
performed provides notice to any interested
party that work has commenced.
Western
Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Co., 18

Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967), H B. Deal
Construction Co. v. Labor Discount Center,
Inc., Mo, 418 S.W2d 940 (1967). Compare
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel
and Assoc, Utah, 600 P.2d 521 (1979).

in January, 1980, Star Palace objected to
rather than the commencement of an improvement to the building within the mean- a trial setting on the ground that the proing of the mechanics' lien statute. In addi- ceedings against Ross Anderson had been
tion, the court found that improvements to stayed as a result of the bankruptcy prothe exterior of the building subsequent to ceeding. On May 29, 1980, Star Palace,
the recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage Crowley and Signs moved to set aside the
rendered the painting "to a large measure default judgments taken against them, and
valueless." Therefore, it follows that Jar- Signs moved to substitute Micro-Investvis & Sons, Dunn, and Royden could not ment as a party in its stead. On August 14,
establish the date of their liens as of the 1980, the trial court denied these motions.
commencement of the general maintenance
Crowley, Star Palace and Signs argue
and c!ean_uj)_woxK. ,
- . ^*that the court erroneously entered default
In sum, there is ample support in the [judgments against them. They cite the
record to support the trial court's findings Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1979),
that the liens in favor of Jarvis, Dunn, and iwhich provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of
Royden did not attach prior to the Caider
this section, a petition filed under section
Bros.' mortgage and do not have priority
301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a
over the mortgage.
stay, applicable to all entities, of—
II. Default Judgments and
(1) the commencement or continuation,
Receivership (No. 17459)
including the issuance or employment
Caider Bros, commenced an action on Auof process, of a judicial, administrative,
gust 21, 1979, against Anderson to foreclose
or other proceeding against the debtor
the purchase money mortgage. Signs, Inc.,
that was or could have been comanother party with an interest in the propmenced before the commencement of
erty, and Michael Crowley, acting for and
the case under this title, or to recover a
on behalf of Star Palace, the party to whom
claim against the debtor that arose beAnderson assigned his interest in the propfore the commencement of the case unerty earlier that year, were also named
der this title;
defendants. 2 Star Palace, however, was not
(2) the enforcement, apainst the debtor
initially made a party to the action. On
or against property of the estate, of h
October 15, 1979, Caider Bros, served an
judgment obtained before the comamended complaint naming Star Palace a
mencement of the case under this title;
defendant. On October 31, 1979, two weeks
(3) any act to obtain possession of
after an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
property of the estate or of property
was filed against Anderson in the United
from the estate;
States Court of Bankruptcy for Idaho, a
(4) any act to create, perfect, or endefault judgment was entered against Miforce any lien against property of the'
chael Crowley in the foreclosure action.3
estate;
Approximately two months later, default
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enjudgments were entered against Star Palace and Signs.
force against property of the debtor
2. On October 17, 1979, Signs assigned its interest in the property to Micro-Investment, an
entity not a party to this action. On December
5, 1979, Micro-Investment filed an answer to
the amended complaint claiming to be the real
party in interest although it had not been
named as a defendant and had not sought an
order allowing substitution of parties or intervention.
On October I, 1979, Crowley, again acting for
and on behalf of Star Palace, apparently entered into an agreement with Anderson to re-

sctnd the assignment of interest in the real
property.
3.

It appears that on November 16, 1979, Crowley deeded all the interest he had in the property to Star Palace and Star Palace deeded its
interest in the premises to Ross Anderson. Although the deed was not recorded, it was delivered to the trustee in bankruptcy apparently to
enable the trustee to acquire jurisdiction over
the Star Palace properties.
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FIRST O F DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS and Citibank, N J L ,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

fat*/ A•verb

C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a
limited partnership, et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
FIRST O F DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS, et al.. Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership, Bland Brothers, Inc., et
al., Defendants and Appellant
Nos. 15696, 16051.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 24, 1979.

Appeal was taken in separate but related proceedings in the Second District Court,
Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer, J., involving allocation of priorities between mortgagees foreclosing against real property and
competing lien claimants who provided
services and materials for improvements to
the property. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held, inter aha, that the trial court
properly determined that the mechanics'
and materialman's liens had priority over
the trust deed.
Affirmed and remanded.

(jjc^l
$ec 4*>v

1. Mechanics' Liens «*=»43 ~~/S
It is not necessary to attachment of
mechanics' lien that matenal or labor be
furnished solely on building structure or
that work be performed solely on lot on
which building is being erected, and contractor should not be barred from enjoying
benefits of mechanics' lien statute where
his work not only enhances value of developer's land but is also necessary to make
residences to be built on sucfrjyroperty habitable. U.C.A.1953, 38-1

••£*>

2. Mechanics* Lien» *=»35
Contractor was entitled to mechanics'
lien in connection with construction project
on 44-acre subdivision for its services in
locating existing lines and putting in pipeline, water and sewer systems and storm
drains. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3.
3. Mechanics' Liens *=»173
Where mortgage loan involved blanket ?
mortgage covering entire 44-acre subdivi- .'.* ^
sion comprising single dwelling lota and <!
condominiums, and initial work of contractor in locating existing lands and putting in
pipelines, water and sewer systems and
storm drains related to and benefited entire
subdivision, such work could not be characterized as being "off-site" improvements
that would not impart notice to lenders;
therefore, mechanics' liens arising from furnishing of materials and labor both on overall development site and on individual condominium units within development related
back to initial work done on project U.C.
A.1953, § 38-1-3.
4. Mechanics' Liens «=»208
To be valid and binding, waiver or release or mechanics' lien by contractor
agreement must be supported by legal consideration; when contractor received cash
and property in exchange for release of
lien, its release of lien rights was therefore
binding as to those rights accrued up t£f~* •\
time of release. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3.
V*
5. Mechanics' Liens <*=»166
Where work of all other lien claimants
on construction project was completed prior
to date on which one claimant released its
lien in exchange for cash and property, and
other claimants' rights had already attached, such other claimants, who were not
parties to relief and did not consent to its
terms, were not affected by relief and such
other lien claimants were entitled to same
priority date as that originally accorded to
releasing claimant. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3,
38-1-10.
6. Stipulations «=>3
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipulations between parties, but such is not case
when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved.
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any lien to the extent that such lien
secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this
title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover
a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case
under this title;
[6] The federal law of bankruptcy supersedes state law to the extent necessary
to further the objectives of administering
the estates of bankrupts. Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d
136 (1979). However, we see nothing in
.".•!Action 362(a) which acts to stay Calder
^ - » r o s . ' action against Star Palace, Signs, and
Crowley. Section 362(a) may, in certain
circumstances, stay judicial proceedings
against not only the debtor in bankruptcy
but also co-defendants when the allegations
against them arise from the same factual
and legal basis and are inextricably interwoven. Federal Life Insurance Co. (Mutual) v. First Financial Group of Texas, 3 B.R.
375 (S.D.Texas 1980). But neither the
terms of the statute nor the nature of the
case requires that co-defendants not file an
answer. If a stay were to appear appropriate thereafter, a motion to the trial court
would suffice. We do not think the action
against Star Palace, Crowley and Signs was
so inextricably interwoven with the bankruptcy proceedings against Anderson that
the proceedings in the Calder Bros.' case
/.'fjV.d to be stayed in toto. Accordingly, the
^ •;;" v *ault judgments against the defendants
^ w e r e properly enforced.
[7] Star Palace, Crowley
contend that if the default
valid, the trial court erred
those judgments aside. A

and Signs also
judgments are
in not setting
default judg-

4. An "entry of default" may be set aside under
rule 55(c) "for good cause shown by the court."
Once a judgment by default has been entered,
however, it may be set aside only in accordance
with rule 60(b).
5. See Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, Utah, 546 P.2d
888 (1976), where the Court held that a request
to set aside a decree made five months after
judgment was properly denied as untimely.

ment may be set aside under rule 60(b) for
the following reasons: 4

set aside the judgment was properly denied.6

Mistakes; Inadvertence;
Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

[8] Finally, it is argued that the lower
court committed reversible error in denying
Star Palace's motion to vacate the order
appointing a receiver since it went beyond
the permissible bounds of the scope of a
receivership. Calder Bros.' motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the
property and to conduct the business of the
tenant, Star Palace, was granted by the
trial court October 4, 1979, pursuant to Rule
66, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court later denied Star Palace's motion to
vacate the order appointing a receiver.

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . .
(7) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4),
not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Star Palace, Crowley and Signs contend
that they complied with the three-month
time limitation applicable to rule 60(bXl).
They argue that the default judgment did
not become effective until the day the automatic stay was lifted. Since there was no
stay in effect, however, the argument fails.
Appellants also rely on subsection (7) of
rule 60(b). A motion to set aside a judgment under that provision need only be
made "within a reasonable time." Therefore, if the motion is well founded under
rule 60(b)(7), it may be timely. However,
rule 60(b)(7) is not available to one who
should have filed under rule 66(b)(1) but did
not. See Ackerman v. United States, 340
U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950);
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69
S.Ct. 304, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949); 7 J. Moore &
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.42
(2d ed. 1982).5 The failure to file an answer
based on a mistake of law raises a rule
60(b)(1) issue and therefore the motion to
But see Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299
P.2d 1114 (1956), where the Court upheld the
trial court's discretion to regard a situation in
which defendant had mistakenly believed she
was fully protected by the divorce decree ordering her ex-husband to pay any real estate
commission arising from the sale of an apartment as among the class of cases that rule
60(b)(7) was intended to govern.

Star Palace relies on Smith v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 25, 26 L.Ed. 637 (1881), in
which the Court held that the receiver was
properly appointed only as to the property
covered by the mortgage. Star Palace argues that its business constitutes property
not covered by the mortgage. In addition,
Star Palace relies on Keyser v. Erickson, 61
Utah 179, 211 P. 698 (1922), which held that
property may not be taken from'a person in
possession pursuant to a court order unless
the person in possession had been accorded
his day in court.
Calder Bros, responds by arguing that the
issue is untimely raised since more than one
month lapsed between the order denying
the motion to vacate the order, appointing
the receiver and the notice of intent to
appeal the judgment. We need not determine the timeliness of raising the issue,
since, even if timely raised, Star Palace
fails on the merits of its claim.

August 21, 1979, but Star Palace was
named in the order appointing a receiver
filed October 4, 1979, and was a named
party in the amended complaint filed October 9,1979, one month before the trial court
signed the amended order appointing a receiver on November 9, 1979.
Affirmed.

Costs to respondents.

HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
James E. BALLENBERGER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 17619.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 25, 1982.

Neither Smith v. McCuIlough nor Keyser
v. Erickson is on point. Unlike McCuIlough, the receivership in this case does not
extend to more property than is involved in
the underlying litigation, and unlike Keyser, Star Palace, the party opposing the receivership, was not a stranger to the proceeding. Not only were Michael Crowley
and Michael Crowley dba Star Palace
named parties in the initial complaint filed

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E.
Banks, J., of theft of property valued over
$1,000, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) considering lateness of
the hour, suspicious movements of defendant and his companion, and fact that officers had been advised of the high rate of
burglaries in the area, together with unobstructed view of C.B. equipment in back of
defendant's car, police officers were justified in making further investigation and
had probable cause to arrest defendant for
theft after defendant's companion admitted
the theft and implicated defendant; (2)
warrantless seizure of contraband from de-

6. Having upheld the default judgment, we find
no merit in Signs' argument that the court
erred in denying its motion to substitute MicroInvestment as Signs' transferee of interest pur-

suant to Rule 25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court properly denied the motion
since it was filed subsequent to the default
judgment.
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7. Stipulations *=»13, 16
Parties are bound by their stipulations
unless relieved therefrom by court, which
has power to set aside stipulation entered
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause
8. Appeal and Error *=»846(5)
Where, in proceedings involving priority of mechanics' hen claims versus claims of
mortgagee, record contained no findings as
to validity or effect of one claimant's stipulation waiving its hen, Supreme Court
would not consider such matter for first
time on appeal
9 Stipulations <*=»n(2)
Whatever effect of stipulation by mechanics' henholder concerning lien's priority
status with reference to trust deed, other
hen claimants who sought priority over
trust deed were in no way bound by stipulation to which they were not parties
10. Appeal and Error <s=» 790(2)
Appeal involving priority of mechanics'
lien claimants with references to trust deed
on construction
project was not moot
where, although sheriffs deed in foreclosure had been issued to mortgagees, they
had not paid amount bid into court as ordered and thus should not have received
deed and lien claimants who had been adjudged to have first priority had not been
paid
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
69(eX0
11. Appeal and Error <s=» 337(1)
Appeal involving issue of priority of
mechanics' lien claims with reference to hen
of deed of trust on construction project was
not premature, despite fact that various
cross claims and counterclaims had not been
resolved by trial court, where such cross
claims and counterclaims were unrelated to
issue of hen priority and no further judicial
action remained to be taken with respect to
issues of priority and sale of property
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 54(b), 72(a)
12 Mortgage* *=»575
In proceedings involving foreclosure
under dued of trust, trial court retained
* - ~ o- »nfnrrement of its decree

mmation regarding hen priorities where no
supersedeas bond was posted prior to sheriff's sale or before motion was made to
have sale vacated

Richard H Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants in 15696 and for
plaintiffs and respondents m 16051
J Anthony Eyre, George H Speciale,
Milo S Marsden, Jr , Albert J Colton, Robert S Howell, David H Schowbe, Richard
C Davidson, Carvel R Shaffer, Salt Lake
City, George K Fadel, Albert E Mann,
Bountiful, John H Kelly, pro s e , LeRoy S
Axland, Randy S Ludlow, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents in 15696
Robert C Cummings, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellant in 16051 and for
defendants and respondents in 15696
Gordon A Madsen, Robert F Orton, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellants in
16051
STEWART, Justice
This appeal from the distnet court consolidates two separate but related proceedings
These proceedings involve the allocation of
priorities between mortgagees foreclosing
against real property in Davis County,
Utah, and competing hen claimants who
provided services and materials for improvements to the property
Plaintiffs, First of Denver Mortgage Investors (' FDMI') and Citibank, N A , were
granted a judgment against defendant
Mountain Spnng3 by the trial court on December 20, 1977, in the amount of $2 358,396 08 The amount represented $1558,005 51 in outstanding principal and $800,390 57 in interest The judgment was secured by a hen on the Lakeview Terrace
subdivision The court's conclusions of law
include the following
4 Plaintiffs have stipulated in open
court that they shall bid only the sum of
one million nine hundred thousand for
said property [at the sheriff's sale] and
take no deficiency judgment against the
c
- « ra ^nnstruc-
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au*jfooFJdMi
Uon Company, nor against any of the recorded on February 19, 1974 The conatruction loan was for the financing of imindividual guarantors
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure provements on the 44-acre property, which
was to comprise 54 single-family building
states
The priority of the mechanic's and mate- sites and 69 condominium units The loan
rialmen's hens is reserved for future de- was due and payable on January 15, 1976
termination and shall be set forth in a
On August 8, 1975, Zundel conveyed the
supplemental Judgment and Decree of
property to Mountain Springs Construction
Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sher- Company, whose stockholders were the
iff's Sale
same individuals who had been Zundel's
The Decree further provides
limited partners Because Zundel had bethat the proceeds of sale be come delinquent on the FDMI loan, FDMI
applied in payment of the Sheriff's cost on September 8, 1975, filed its first comof sale and thereafter to the parties in plaint for foreclosure In November FDMI
accordance with the priority to be deter- concluded a supplemental loan agreement
with Mountain Springs, the successor to
mined by the court
The court subsequently entered its order C N Zundel and Associates, which modified
awarding priority to mechanics' hens the construction loan so as to require repayclaimed by eight defendants The appeal ment in installments in July 1976, October
1976, July 1977, and December 1977
from that order by plaintiffs is Case No
15696 in this Court
The following hen claimants first perIn a consolidated case, No 16051, defend- formed work on the Lakeview property for
ant Bland Brothers, Inc ("Bland Bros") Mountain Springs on the dates indicated
appeals from the lower court's denial of its Child Bros, November 15, 19J3, Duncan
motion to set aside the sheriff's sale held Electric, January 22, 1975, Robert J Warpursuant to the foreclosure action and rais- drop, December 1, 1975, Countertop Shop,
es procedural issues in connection there- Inc, March 9, 1976, Max D Scheel, April
with We shall examine first the common 19, 1976, Ronald Graham Tile Co, March
facts underlying these cases and then deal 23, 1976, and Bland Bros, March 8, 1976
separately with the issues raised on appeal
Additionally, Holt-Witmer provided wallpaThis litigation concerns a subdivision per and linoleum under contract with Zunwhich originally comprised 44 acres in del commencing January 1, 1975 Except
Bountiful, Utah, known as Lakeview Ter- for Child Bros, the hen claimants all perrace subdivision A trust deed was record- formed labor or furnished materials on varied as to this property on August 1, 1973, ous condominium units situated on the
when plaintiff FDMI made a loan of $450,property l
000 to C N Zundel and Associates, a limited
In June 1976 Child Bros, as credit in the
partnership In November 1973 defendant
Child Brothers, Inc ("Child Bros") com- approximate amount of $22,000 toward the
menced the first^worlc on the propexLy-fox, sum owed by Zundel and Mountain Springs,
« C N_ZujideJ JJThe work consisted of locat-J accepted a check for $13 210 and a warranl ing existing lines and putting in pipeline,V ty deed to two lots in the subdivision
j water and sewer systems, and storm drains J FDMI's trust deed provided that the title to
~/J Subsequently; the original FDMl loan was the property deeded to Child Bros would
refinanced, and the 1973 trust deed re- revert to FDMI if the required payment
leased, with FDMI advancing $1,500,000 to was not made by July 1, 1976 In exchange
Zundel and several limited partners This for the payment in cash and property, Child
amount was secured by a new trust deed Bros executed a release of all hens and
1

On June 13 1979 orders of dismissal based
on settlements between the parties were en
tered in this Court dismissing the following

parties Child Bros Duncan Electric, Counter
top Shop, and Holt Witmer
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claims The release was recorded on June
22, 1976
Mountain Springs failed to pay the July
1976 installment on its note to FDMI A
partial assignment of the promissory note
and trust deed from FDMI to Citibank,
N A , was recorded on July 30, 1976, and
FDMI and Citibank on August 2, 1976, filed
an amended complaint seeking foreclosure
of the property Mountain Springs answered, counter-claimed for damages, and filed
a lis pendens against the property
One
year later Child Bros cross-claimed for
money due and failure of warranty on the
lots conveyed to it
Subsequently, the
plaintiffs and the hen claimant defendants
moved for summary judgment
Following the December 20, 1977, hearing, plaintiffs were awarded a judgment
against Mountain Springs the question of
hen priority was reserved for later determination
The sheriff's sale took place on
January 19, 1978
Plaintiff FDMI bid
$1,900,000 for the property, no higher bids
were received On January 24, the court
entered a Memorandum Decision awarding
the hen claimants first priority over the
plaintiffs That ruling involved total hens
in t h e j ^ ^ p j r t e j j j u i i o ^ ^ ^
^ m a k i n g its ruling, the court in effect rejected a stipulation signed by attorneys for
Child Bros and FDMI on January 11, 1978,
that Child Bros ' hen was junior to the trusj
ideed /"The pro"vTsions or tKe Memorandum
/Decision were embodied in the court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment and Order
Amending Certificate of Sale on February
1, 1978 Pursuant to this order, the sheriffs certificate of sale was amended to
change plaintiff s bid to $1,937 397 42 On
February 16, 1978, following the entry of a
summary judgment in favor of hen claimant Holt Witmer, the court entered another
order requiring "that the sheriffs certificate of sale shall be amended to show that
plaintiffs bid for the property is the sum of
$1,944,732 8 6 "
Child Bros ' cross-claim and counterclaims
against Zundel, Mountain Springs, and
plaintiffs were dismissed following a trial
2

on February 1, 1978 Child B r o s ' counsel
was not present at the trial for reasons set
out in an affidavit filed with Child Bros'
appellate brief
On these facts, the plaintiffs FDMI and
Citibank m Case No 15696 seek reversal of
the summary judgment dated February 1,
1978, awarding the named hen claimants
priority over plaintiffs' trust deed
Plaintiffs contend that hens for materials
furnisned for construction in Lakeview Terrace could not relate back to the date of the
first work commenced on November 15
1973, by Child Bros for two_bi<Mc reasons I
First, plaintiffs characterize Child Bros
work as 'off site improvements" a*5d irgue ,
that hens arising subsequent to such lm- j
provements and after the recording of I
plaintiffs trust deed which relate to specif J
IC structures cannot relate back to the date!
of the commencement of ChiId_BrosJ_work/
Second plaintiffs rely on Child Bros' re{
lease of its cla ms to a hen for work per-\
formed prior to June 17, 1976
Plaintiffs)
further argue that the work done in October 1976 by Child Bros was not under the
same contract as work done previously by
Child Bros on Lakeview Terrace and was
therefore, as stipulated by Child Bros , junior and subordinate to plaintiffs' trust deed
•Whether" t h e ' lo"v7er~""court decided the
question of hen priority properly depends
on a consideration of several propositions of
law underlying plaintiffs' contentions
* The first issue is whether the improvements by Child Bros met the general statutory requirements under Utah law for the
^^^
attachment of mechanics' hens The Utah
f
J
hen statute § 38-1-3,* lists the following y 7 ^ - ] M )
persons among those entitled to a mechan\~S
ICS hen
Contractors, subcontractors and
i A <\£<Jtf7
all persons performing any services or fur- ^
-,
nishmg any materials used in the construe
3
tion, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to
any premises m any manner
"
"The purpose of the hen statutes is to
protect those who have added directly to
the value of property by performing labor

AH statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended
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or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton
Transportation Co v Davis, 9 Utah 2 d l 8 4 .
34i-P^2d-.2Q7^2Q941959^r"The broaTV
anguage, "improvement to any premises i n /
any manner/j^ncompal^cs^nTlnstant^ase
where sewer and water systems were installed on the subject property

argument that our mechanic*' hen statute
provides that hens are to date back only to
the time each individual structure waa commenced

Western Mortgage involved the relative
priorities of mechanics' hens and a construction mortgage on a single lot in a subdivi[1,2] It is not necessary to the attach- sion The question waa whether hen claimment of a mechanics' hen that the material ants who had furnished labor or materials
or labor be furnished solely on a building that went into the construction of the house
structure or that the work be performed on that single lot were entitled to tack for
solely on the lot on_which a building is priority purposes to work comprising "offbemg-erected / W e agree with~the~New - \ site improvements," i e , the laying out the
subdivision and the installation of water
Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J R
Christ Construction Co v Willete Assocs, lines, sewer, curb and gutter, and street
47 N J 473, 221 A 2d 538 (1966), that a paving done earlier in connection with the
contractor should not be barred from enjoy- subdivision as a whole The hen claimants
ing the benefits of the mechanics' hen stat- cited § 38-1-5, which reads in part as folute where his work not only enhances the lows
value of the developer's land, but is also
Pnonty—Over other encumbrances —
necessary to make residences to be built on J
The hens herein provided for shall relate
1 such property habitable .^He~~court "held
back to, and take effect as of, the time of
*T?T2r~whcre" a developer engages the conthe commencement to do work or furnish
tractor to install a sewer system for a submaterials on the ground for the structure
division project, the contractor, if he comor improvement, and shall have p n o n t y
plies with required statutory procedures, is
over any hen, mortgage or other encumentitled to a mechanics' hen against the
brance which may have attached subsedevelopers property for the cost of labor
quently to the time when the building,
and materials furnished The New Jersey
improvement or structure was comCourt cited Ladue Contracting Co v Land
menced, work begun, or first material
Development Co_, 337 S W_2d 578JMo App
furnisbed-^n~the-grottn4-^_^^_
,
1960)f in emphasizing the fact that water jjjfThis Court held that the recorded construe
/ and sewer systems are essential to the com J
/ tion mortgage took pnonty over the me
j fortable and convenient use of dwellings
chanics' hens because m that case the hens
and that it would be "turn[ing] the clock
[ could not relate back to the date of com
back to another century" to hold that such
mencement of off site improvements^ The
improvements are outside the terms of the
"^asioTTresTed on the~issue"oTnotice The
hen statute (Id at 585)_
-J Court stated, 18 Utah 2d at 412, 424 P 2d at
•
'
—
^"TRe second issue is whether the priority 439
/
The presence of materials on the build
of matenalmen s hens is different with respect to a blanket construction loan for a / ing site or evidence on the ground that
subdivision comprising single dwelling lots i work has commenced on a structure or
j preparatory thereto is notice to a)) the
and condominiums as compared with a con\ world that hens may have attached j
struction loan for a single dwelling in a
\ However" the off site construction in desubdivision where there may have been
veloping the subdivision for building sites
"off site improvements that would not imwould not necessanly bring to the atten
part notice to lenders of the latter t>pe of
tion of a lender that someone is claiming
loan Pluntiffs rely on this Courts deci
a hen on a particular lot in the subdivi
sion in Western Mortgage Loan Corp v
sion This is especially true as in this
Cottonwooii Construction Co, 18 Utah 2d
case, where the lender advanced money
409, 424 P2d 437 (1907), to support their
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to build a home long after the subdivision
had been laid out and developed.

valid liens stand, in this case, on equal
footing in dating their liens from the time
work commenced. We therefore hold that
the mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing of materials and labor both on the
overall development site and on individual
condominium units within the development
relate back to the initial work done on the
project by Child Bros.

[3] The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Western Mortgage.
Here
we are not dealing with a lender who made
a loan on a single lot within a subdivision
and who had no reason to be on notice as to
the existence of prior work. In this case,
the initial work performed by Child Bros,
related to and benefited the entire subdiviA third issue involves the effect of Child
sion. The mortgage loan in question was a Bros.' execution in June 1976 of a document
blanket mortgage covering the entire subdi- titled "Release of All Liens and Claims"
vision. Because the initial work was per- pertaining to the Lakeview property. The
formed over substantial portions of the notarized release document recited that for
property involved, it could notjpjrop_erly__be a valuable consideration Child Brothers,
^h^acjejnzed-a3^^nTg^3f£-site^l-as. w_ere * Inc., by its president, Eugene Child, who
^he^improvements in Western Mortgage in signed the document, "release[d] and disrelation to the property that was the sub- charge[d]" Mountain Springs, FDMI, Zunject of the construction loan. Furthermore, del, and the Lakeview subdivision property,
the claimant of the mechanics' lien in Westfrom any and all liens, claims, demands,
ern Mortgage performed the labor on a lot
damages, actions at law or in equity
entirely separate from the initial work. In
arising out of any contractual or other
the present case the claimants performed
relationship . . . and/or claims of
their work on the same site, i. e., the 44
liens, arising or accruing on or before
acres covered by FDMI's construction loan.
[date omitted], or existing on that
date
.
and all matters involved
Plaintiffs also cite Aladdin Heating Corp.
in any and all claims of liens for all labor
v. Trustees of Cent. States, Nevada, 563
performed upon, and all materials furP.2d 82 (1977), in which the court refused to
nished to [the Lakeview subdivision proprelate mechanics' liens back to pre-construcerty] arising on or before, or existing on,
tion architectural, soil testing, and survey
the date specified above, by the underwork. The court in Aladdin required "visisigned, and by all agents, employees, supble signs of construction to inform prospecpliers, [etc.]
. all of whom the
tive lenders [who inspected] the premises
undersigned hereby warrants have been
that liens had attached," and the work perfully paid, and none of whom has any
formed in that case and others cited therein
further claim or lien against such real
resulted in nothing that would put a lender
estate as of the date specified above.
on notice because of the visibility of the
work. In the instant case Child Bros, laid
water line and sewer pipe for the subdiviThat the parties hereto intend hereby
sion, commencing its first work on Novemthat this Release of All Liens and Claims
ber 15, 1973. The trial court made no speshall be a. final and complete release and
cific findings as to the visibility of Child
discharge of [Mountain Springs, FDMI,
Bros.' work at the time the loan agreement
Zundel, and the Lakeview bulnhvision] by
was entered into, and this issue was not
the undersigned, [his heirs, assigns,
raised or argued by plaintiffs. The work
agents, employees, etc }, and all other perdone by Child Bros , however was concededsons performing labor upon or furnishing
ly more substantial than that done in Aladmaterials
.
as of the date specidin. Accordingly, Aladdin is distinguishafied above, at the instance of the underble from the present case.
signed.
Based on our statute and the issues sub- The document was dated June 17, 1976, it
mitted by the parties, the materialmen with was recorded on June 22, 1976.

As this Court stated in upholding the
waiver of lien rights in Dwyer v. Salt Lake
City Copper Mfg. Co., 14 Utah 339, 344, 47
P. 311, 312 (1896), "A mechanic's lien is a
privilege conferred by statute, and ordinarily may be waived by express agreement of
the party in whose favor it exists." The
legitimacy of a release of lien rights was
also recognized in G. Chicoine Contractors,
Inc. v. John Marshal Bldg. Corp., 77 111.
App.2d 437, 222 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1966),
where the court stated, "One right the lien
claimant has is to execute his full and general waiver releasing his rights to a mechanic's lien against the property." The
court then quoted the following language
from Decatur Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Crail,
350 111. 319, 324, 183 N.E. 228, 230 (1932):
While a waiver of lien for a clearly expressed special purpose will be confined
by the courts to the purpose intended,
yet, where a general waiver is executed,
and there is nothing in the context to
show a contrary intention, there is nothing left for the court to do but enforce
the contract as the parties have made it.
[4] To be valid and binding a waiver or
release of a mechanics' lien by contract or
agreement must be supported by a legal
consideration. Kelly v. Johnson, 251 III.
135, 95 N.E. 1068 (1911); Skidmore v. Eby,
57 N.M. 669, 262 P.2d 370 (1953). Child
Bros, received cash and property in exchange for the release. Its release of lien
rights is therefore binding as to those rights
accrued up to the time of the release, at
least as to it.
[5] As to the lien claimants left in the
case, all their work on the project was completed prior to the date of Child Bros.'
release. Their lien rights had already attached. These lienholders were not parties
to the release, did not consent to its terms,
and are not in the category of subcontractors or materialmen performing labor or
furnishing materials at the instance of
Child Bros, and therefore the release does
not affect their status as lienholders They
are entitled to the same priority date as
that originally accorded Child Bros, whose
work was the first done on the project, in

accordance with U.C.A. § 38-1-10, which
provides:
The liens for work and labor done or
material furnished as provided in this
chapter shall be upon an equal footing,
regardless of date of filing the notice and
claim of lien and regardless of the time of
performing such work and labor or furnishing such material.
A final issue relating to lien priority ii,
this case is whether the stipulation that
Child's lien was junior to plaintiffs' had any
binding legal effect. The stipulation was
signed by attorneys for FDMI and Child
Bros, on the 11th of January, 1978. I t
states that Child Bros, released its lien
against the Lakeview property and that
Child Bros, was the grantee in a warranty
deed recorded June 22, 1976, covering Lots
59 and 60, Lakeview Terrace. The second
paragraph states:
Said parties hereby stipulate that the
warranty deed is junior and subordinate
to the lien or [sic] plaintiff's Trust Deed
and that defendant Child Bros. Inc. has a
lien in the sum of $13,450.52 which lien is
junior and subordinate to plaintiff'3 Trust
Deed. [Emphasis added.]
[6,7] Ordinarily, courts are bound by
stipulations between parties, Koron
v.
Myers, 87 Idaho 567, 394 P.2d 634 (1964),
Riordan v. Commercial Travelers Mut. In *
Co., 11 Wash App. 707, 525 P.2d 804 (1974).
Such is not the case, however, when points
of law requiring judicial determination are
involved, Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211
Kan 833, 508 P 2d 889 (1973), In Re EstAte
of Maguire, 204 Kan. 686, 466 P.2d 358,
modified 206 Kan. 1, 476 P.2d 618 (1970);
Cox v. City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 291
P 2d 282 (1955). Parties are bound by their
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by
the court, which has the power to set aside
a stipulation entered into inadvertently or
for justifiable cause, Klein v. Klein, Utah,
544 P.2d 472 (1975); Johnson v. Peoples
Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272
P2d 171 (1954); Guard v. County of Maricopa, 14 Ariz App. 187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971);
Higby v. Higby, Colo App, 538 P.2d 493
(1975); Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110,
558 P.2d 1071 (1977).
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[8,9] In the present case, the trial court
apparently disregarded the stipulation of
FDMI and Child Bros as to lien priority
The record contains no findings as to the
validity or effect of the stipulation, and this
Court will not consider this matter for the
first time on appeal Whatever the effect
of the stipulation upon Child B r o s ' priority
status, the other hen claimants who sought
priority over FDMI's trust deed are m no
way bound by a stipulation to which they
were not parties, Thomas v State, 57 Haw
639, 562 P 2d 425 (1977)
[10] Bland Bros, also a defendant in
Case No 15696, raises the further issues
thatt this appeal is both moot and premature Mootness is claimed because plaintiff
FDMI has bid $1,944,732 8 6 3 for the property at the sheriff's sale and is thus required
to pay that amount to the sheriff pursuant
to Rule 69{eX4), which states that every bid
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer and
that the purchaser is liable on such bid
Because the amount bid would satisfy fully
the claims of the lienors, as well as plaintiffs, defendants claim that the plaintiffs
have no grounds for bringing an appeal
Plaintiffs conceded that should someone
pay the amount of $1,944,732 86 during the
redemption period, the hen claimants would
receive $44,732 86, and the appeal would
become moot Otherwise, plaintiffs argue
that this Court should determine the hen
claimants to be junior and subordinate to
their trust deed Bland Bros claims that
the redemption period cannot expire where
no payment has been made pursuant to the
order of sale
The record shows that plaintiffs themselves stipulated to the amount to be bid
and moved the trial court on the 11th day
of February, 1978, to amend the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale to provide that the total
amount to be paid was $1,944,732 86, in the
event that hen claimant Holt-Witmer was
granted first priority An order was signed
by the court so amending the certificate of
sale Plaintiffs' objections at this point are
3

Since this case is to be remanded to the trial
court we leave to that court the determination
of what effect the settlements made during the

more a change of mind than a justifiable
claim of error on the part of the trial court
Although a sheriff's deed was issued to the
plaintiffs, they, have not paid the amount
bid into the court as ordered and thus
should not have received a deed The lien
claimants who had been adjudged to have
first priority have not been paid The issues raised herein are not moot
[11] Defendant Bland Bros also argues
that this appeal is premature because various cross-claims and counterclaims have not
been resolved Unless an appeal may be
taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), U R C P , or
our interlocutory appeal procedure, only "final orders" are appealable to this Court, see
Rule 72(a), U R C P
Bland Bros claims
that there was no final order until hen
claimant Holt-Witmer's priority status was
adjudicated on February 22, 1978
The order of February 22, 1978, was an
amendment to the order dated February 1,
1978 Although the notice of appeal states
that it is the February 1 order that is
appealed, we deem that order to incorporate
by amendment the order of February 22
since it was entered prior to the filing of
the notice of appeal
Nonetheless, it is
clear that certain cross claims and counterclaims unrelated to the issue of hen priority
remain to be adjudicated
Whether an order is deemed a "final order" is not necessarily dependent in all instances upon whether all issues in a lawsuit
have been adjudicated The test to be applied is a pragmatic test See Brown Shoe
Co v Umteti States, 370 U S 294, 82 S Ct
1502, 8 L Ed 2d 510 (1962), Wright, Federal
Courts, 505 (3rd ed ) In the instant case no
further judicial action remains to be taken
with respect to the issues of priority and
the sale of the property and, but for the
appeal, sale of the property and disbursement of the proceeds would occur To require the appeal to abide the determination
of pending unrelated claims would make an
appeal on the issue of priorities moot Unless an appeul may be taken at this point,
pendency of the appeal (see Footnote 1) should
make with respect to plaintiffs bid
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substantial property interests may be destroyed since the sheriff's sale would proceed and the money would be disbursed on
the basis of the priorities determined by the
trial court With the issuance of a sheriffs
deed and the disbursement of monies, the
legal rights and obligations of the parties
are finally established Accordingly, under
a pragmatic view of the test of finality, the
order appealed in this case is final

law with respect to the execution of process, and if for any reason such process is
improperly executed, then and in such
case to vacate the improper proceeding
had pursuant to the process, and order
the issuance of another in lieu thereof
The court below was in error in holding
that it was without jurisdiction to hear
and determine the motion to vacate the*
order of sale

Consolidated with the appeal of FDMI
and Citibank in Case No 15696 is an appeal
by Bland Bros , Case No 16051, which challenges the refusal of the trial court to set
aside the sheriffs sale held pursuant to the
foreclosure order The facts pertaining to
this appeal may be set out briefly
The
Lakeview Terrace property was offered at
a sheriff's sale on January 19, 1978 FDMI,
pursuant to its agreement, bid the sum (as
amended) of $1,944 732 86, and subsequently
received the sheriff's dtt.d to the property
Before the deed was issued, and when the
normal six-month redemption period was
about to expire, Bland Bros moved the
lower court to vacate the sale because plaintiff FDMI had failed to pay the amount of
its bid into the court as had been ordered
The trial court in an order dated August 15,
1978, denied the motion, stating that its
jurisdiction was lost when the appeal regarding lien priorities was taken to the
Supreme Court The court on its own motion ordered FDMI to post a supersedeas
bond in the amount of the claims of the
mechanics' henholders who had been adjudged to have first priority

Bland Bros also points out a defect in the
publication of notice of the sheriffs sale,
namely that there was no publication in a
Davis County newspaper in the week immediately preceding the sale as required by
Rule 69(eXl), (3), U R C P Since this issue
should be considered by the trial court in
connection with the determination as to the
validity of the sheriffs sale, we decline to
deal with it here

[12] Blind Bros argues that the lower
court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of its decree inasmuch as no supersedeas bond was posted prior to the sheriff's
sale or before Bland Bros' motion to have
the safe VAtdttd
This position is correct
and is sustained by this Court's opinion in
Skeen v I
t H7 Utah 121, at 125, 48 P 2d
457, at 458 (19J5), which statid
As an incident to the authority remaining
in the trial court to enforce a decree of
foreclosure, where an appeal is had without a supersedeas bond or stay, is the
authority to compel compliance with the

Our decision regarding the priority issue
makes it unnecessary to rule on additional
matters argued by the parties herein It is
the opinion of this Court that the lower
court was correct in granting priority to the
mechanics' hen claimants inasmuch as the
initial work by Child Bros established the
priority date for all who provided labor and
services on the Lakeview Terrace subdivision The action of the trial court as to the
setting of priorities is therefore affirmed a a
it pertains, to the hen claimants who remain
as parties to this appeal
We affirm the trial court's determination
that the mechanics' and materialmen's hens
of the defendants whose appeal his not
been dismissed have priority over FDMI's
trust deed We remand for any necessary
consideration of the issues raised with respect to the sheriff's sale
Costs to defendants
CROCKCIT, C J , and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and HALL, J J , concur

o( 6oo f^d*
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 27, 10G7.

Action involving priorities of construction mortgage and mechanics' liens. T h e
Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Aldon J. Anderson, J., made findings as to
relative priorities of mechanics' lienors and
mortcigcc, and the lienors took an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Tuckctt, J., held that construction money mortgage providing that mortgage will also
secure additional loans made by the then
holder of the note secured to the then owner
of the real estate described, provided that
no such additional loan would be made if
the making thereof would cause the total
indebtedness secured to exceed the amount
of the original indebtedness, created obligation on part of lender to pay over funds
in accordance with borrower's directions
and mortgagee had priority for monies actually advanced under mortgages over liens
for materials furnished subsequent to recording of mortgages.
Affirmed.

thcrcof would cause the total indebtedness
secured to exceed the amount of the original indebtedness, created obligation on part
of lender to pay over funds in accordance
with borrower's directions, and mortgagee
thus had priority for monies actually advanced under mortgage over liens for materials furnished subsequent to recording
of mortgage. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5.
2. Mechanics' Lions C=»I73
Statute providing for mechanics' Hen
upon "commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground" is limited to
the home or other structure which is being
or about to be built upon the land, and liens
for labor or materials furnished inj off-site
improvements in connection with laying out
and construction of facilities used in connection with subdivision as a whole would
not relate back and take effect as of time
first work was done in respect to laying out
the subdivision and the installation of water
lines, sewers, curbs and gutters and street
paving. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5.
^
See publication Words and P h r a s e s
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

3. Mechanics' Liens <3=*183
Presence of materials on building site
or evidence on the ground that work has
commenced on " structure or preparatory
thereto is notice to all the world that liens
may have attached, however, off-site construction in developing subdivision for building sites would not necessarily bring to attention of lendor that someone might be
claiming lien to particular lot, especially
where lendor advances construction money
to build home long after subdivision has
been developed. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5.

Ilcnriod, J., dissented in part.

I. Mortgages C=>151(3)
Construction money mortgage providing that mortgage would secure additional
loans made by the then holder of the note
secured to the then owner of the real estate
described but providing that no such addi-

VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
Fabian & Clcndcnin, Cannon, Duffin &
Pace, Maik & Schoenhals, Neslcn & Mock,
Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Ilalliday & Ilalliday, Backman, Backman & Clark, Ray Quinncy & Nebckcr,
Salt Lake City, for respondent
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C K X T T , Justice

uis case is now before the court on an
ocutory appeal
It involves the rela/«* priorities of mechanics lienors' and a
oi -truction m o r t g a g e which the plaintiff
rd respondent seeks to foreclose on lot 10,
u,i«./ B a r Subdivision of Salt Lake County
T h e district court made certain rulings
sf which the following two a r c the subject
Df this appeal
1 T h a t the documents evidencing the
mortgage transaction between the plaintiffrespondent, W e s t e r n M o r t g a g e Loan Corpoi ition and the defendant, Cottonwood
instruction Company, provided for oblig«. Q-/ or nonvohtional advances, and that
si c I adv anccs together with attorneys fees
r id costs take priority as of the time of the
r e ^ r j i n g of the m o r t g a g e
2
A denial of the mechanics lienors*
r^ot on for a partial summary judgment to
trie effect that certain work constituted the
' commencement to do work or furnish materials on the g r o u n d for the structure or
improvement" within the meaning of Section 38-1-5, U C A 1 9 5 3
T i u work of laying out and developing
n e subdivision, including engineering, in
st tl ig water mains, sewer mains and later
aii>, c u r b and g u t t e r , surfacing streets and
other off site construction was accomphsl cd by Cottonwood Construction Com
nany ( t h e m o r t g a g o r ) and its predecessors
I n e l i t e r a l sewer line installed on l o t 10
terminated inside the lot T h e sewer and
iteral w e r e completed about J a n u a r y 1,
1961 W a t e r m a m s were completed about
August, 1962, streets, curb and gutter were
commenced in 1961 and completed in 1962
1 he Mountain States Telephone and 1 ele
gr iph Company erceted utility poles m the
subdivision, including one on Lot 10
Application for a construction lo m w is
m ide to W e s t e r n M o r t g a g e Loan Coipora
tion and appro\ cd A note and mortg igc in
the amount of $1S,750 00 were executed
I

ITt il» S miiAjs & T (urn \*»vo<nhon v
Mich mi, 12 Utnh Jil J3T, oOO 1'IW 5«W

October 29, 1962, and the m o i t g a g e was recorded that day

case U n d e r the terms of the loan agree
ment W e s t e r n was obligated to deposit the
net proceeds of the loan in a separate account to be expended in accoi dance with the
a g r e e m e n t T h e mortgage provides for additional loans to be secured by the mortgage,
nevertheless, the instrument is for a single
fixed amount, and no additional loans were
in fact made

A separate loan agreement* was entered
into between W e s t e r n and Cottonwood Construction Company, which piovtded in part
t h a t in event of default on the part of the
m o r t g a g o r , W e s t e r n was released from all
further obligations to the borrower, or in
t h e alternative, it could take possession of
the premises, finish the impro\ e m a i l s and
c h a r g e the costs to the borrower to. be
secured on the note and mortgage
W h e n it later became apparent th it
Cottonwood h i d misapphtd fundi a d \ a n c e d
by W e s t e r n , the l i t t e r elected to complete
t h e home A t the time W e s t e r n took over
the construction it had advanced approximately $9,500 An additional sum of about
$5,000 w a s used to complete the home on
Lot 10
[ 1 ] A provision of the note and mort
gage is as follows
" T h i s m o r t g a g e shall
also secure addition il loans hereafter made
by the then holder of the note secured h e r e by to the then owner of the real estate
described herein, provided that no such ad
chtional loan shall be made if the m i k n g
thereof would cause the tot il indebtedness
secured hereby to exceed the imount of the
original indebtedness stated herein "
I t is the appellants' contention that the
l a n g u a g e of the note and
mortgage
quoted above provided for nonvohtional or
nonobhgatory ad\ mces and that each ad
v a n c e made thereunder takes priority only
as of its date
U n d e r the construction loan agreement
W e s t e r n was o b h g i t e d to p i> out the funds
as the building progressed
W e are ot the
opinion that the agreement to disburse the
funds created <\n obligation on the part of
lender to pay over the funds m aecord
ance with the borrower's d i r e c t i o n s 1 \Vc
see no distinction between the mortgage in
Ut ih S iv nigs «1 l o a n Association v Me
ch im 2 and the mortgage before us in this.
2

Ibi.l ^. nlky I umber Co v \\ ri^ht 2
t_ il App 2S8, 84 P 5i>, Home S n i n g s

V

thereto is notice to all the world that h e n s T
m a y h a v e attached. H o w e v e r , the off-|
site construction in developing the sub j
division for building sites would not neces I
s a n l y bring to the attention of a lender \
that someone is claiming a lien on a p a r t i a l - l
lar lot in the subdivision This is especially j
t r u e as in this case, w h e r e the lender adv anccd money to build a home long after the
subdivision had been laid out and developed
It is a p p a r e n t that the persons who supplied
labor or materials for the construction of
roads, sewers, e t c , could have filed hens
for imp n d balances due them, if any. T h e
erection of the home was separate and scv
erable from the earlier work in developing
Ithe subdivision 3
^
/

T h e appellants' second assignment of
e r r o r relates to the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment based upon a
finding that the facts set forth in the supporting affidavits did not constitute "commencement to do work or furnish materials
on the ground for the structure or improvem e n t " within the meaning of Section 38—1—
5 U C A 1953 T h e appellants claim they
T h e o r d e r s and rulings of the district
a r e entitled to have their hens relate back
court a r c affirmed. Costs to respondent
and take effect as of the time the first
w o r k was done in respect to laving out the
C A I L I S 1 E R and T L L L T , J J , concur
subdivision and the installation of water-*
lines, sewers, curb and gutters and street
paving
C R O C K E T T , Chief Justice (concurring
specially) .
[2 3] W e arc not inclined to give tin?
I a g r e e that under the facts as disclosed
statute such a broad meaning as contended
for by the appellants W e a r e inclined to' in this case a m o r t g a g e for a definite
the view that the legislature intended the j amount, which is recorded prior to the at
tachment of any hen rights, should under
language commencement to do work or
normal circumstances take preference up to
furnish materials on the g r o u n d " to be hm
the a m o u n t that is paid out under the terms
ited to relate to the home or other structure
of the recorded m o r t g a g e agreement
But
which was being or about to be built upon
I desire to note that there may be situations
the land T o tack the hens for labor or materials that went into the construction of the, in which the lending institution is holding
monev not yet advanced on a building, when
house to the hens that may have arisen for
it a c q u n c s actual knowledge that the builder
labor and m a t e n lis furnished in off site imis diverting money to some other purpose,
provements in connection with the laying
and knows t h a t the laborers or materialmen
out di\d construction of faciht es used in
a r e not being paid and will not be paid
connection with the subdivision as a whole
U n d e r such circumstances the financier ccr
would be going beyond the intent of the
tainly should not be permitted to go on paystatute T h e problem is one of notice T h e
ing the money to a builder and thus in effect
presence of materials on the building site
assist in cheating the laborers and materialor evidence on the ground that work has
men out of their pay and preclude them
commenced on a structure or preparatory
& T o in Asso ntion
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from the right to Hen protection. Sec dissenting opinion of Jones, District Judge, in
U t a h Savings & L o a n Association v. M e cham, 12 U t a h 2d 335, 366 P 2d 598.
H E N R I O D , Justice (concurring and dissenting) :
I concur in t h a t portion of the main opinion with respect to commencement of work,
etc., but dissent from that portion having to
do with priority of liens of materialmen.
T h e main opinion says, " W e sec no distinction between the mortgage in U t a h S a v ings & Loan Association v. M e d i a n . " T h i s
statement is disarming. T r u e , there is no
difference in the recorded mortgage, upon
which U t a h S a v i n g s relied, and the one
h e r e . T h e fallacy of the main opinion's
conclusion lies in its assumption that the
cjuse of action in the U t a h Savings case
was identical to this present Western M o r t gage case. T h e former was based on the
recorded m o r t g a g e , while in this case it was
based on an unrecorded
collate} at a g r e e ment snuggled to the bosoms of the m o r t gagor and mortgagee, without any opportunity for the materialmen to take a looksee.
T h e cases a r e not the same. In U t a h
Savings, materialmen could rely on the record. I n our present case the main opinion
charges materialmen with notice of an unrecorded, independent agreement.
The
recorded m o r t g a g e in Utah Savings said advancement of moneys by the m o r t g i g e e w a s
obligatory.
T h e unrecorded
collateral
agreement in the present case clearly was
not obligatory, but volitional. A materialman may not deliver a two-by-four piece of
plywood if he knew he could not rely on the
recorded promise of the mortgagee to pay
the m o r t g a g o r as represented, but would be
bound by a secret, unrecorded agreement
that would permit the mortgngec to cancel
the recorded promise five minutes after it
was recorded, an incident beyond the ken of
a materialman. T o conclude otherwise does
not dignify the recording act.
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